How to design climate negotiations: use the science of cooperation!

Price Carbon – I will if you will

David J C MacKay FRS, Peter Cramton,
Axel Ockenfels, and Steven Stoft

Nature Vol 526 Page 315-316 | 15 October 2015

I think this is the most important piece of writing I have ever been involved in.

Summary

International negotiations can and should be designed in way that takes into account the science of cooperation.

Reciprocity is the key to realigning self-interests and promoting cooperation.
"Individual commitments" and "reviews" will not solve the tragedy of the commons.
A common commitment ("I will if you will") can.

What sort of common commitment would work best?
We argue that a global carbon-price commitment could yield a strong treaty, especially if coupled to Green Fund transfers, incentivizing low-emitting countries to support a high carbon price.

Read the comment on Nature's website, and for further details see carbon-price.com.